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NO. 13 FEBRUARY 2021 Introduction 
A Restrained Embrace 
South Korea’s Response to Germany’s Indo-Pacific Strategy 
Eric J. Ballbach and Laura Morazzini 
While the adoption of the Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific (PGIP or Guidelines) 
by the Federal Foreign Office of Germany in September 2020 has raised significant 
interest among observers, much more attention needs to be paid to the role and 
response of the designated “core partners” in the region. The example of South Korea 
is especially important in this regard. On the one hand, there is much yet untapped 
potential to increase cooperation, given the overlaps in Berlin’s and Seoul’s Indo-
Pacific strategies. On the other hand, South Korea’s restrained reaction to the Guide-
lines both reflects the geopolitical dilemma within which some regional partners are 
operating and foreshadows potential implementation challenges. 
 
On 1 September 2020, Germany’s Federal 
Foreign Office published the new Policy 
Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific, reflecting 
the increased strategic importance of the 
Indo-Pacific region for Germany’s Asia 
policy. A major objective of the PGIP is the 
diversification of Germany’s Asia policy. To 
that end, the Guidelines identify a number 
of areas in which Germany aims to increase 
cooperation with the regional partners, 
e.g., in the field of security; the fight against 
climate change and marine pollution; 
strengthening the rule of law and human 
rights; and expanding economic relations 
and enhancing exchanges in the cultural, 
education, and scientific spheres. 
As the successful implementation of 
the PGIP hinges upon a fruitful cooperation 
with the regional partners, it is crucial to 
understand their role in, and their reaction 
to, the German Guidelines. South Korea 
represents a special case in this context. 
While many states in the region have 
waited for, and consequently openly em-
braced, the fact that Germany spoke up and 
formulated a strategy for the Indo-Pacific 
region, South Korea’s response was much 
more restrained. At first sight, this might 
be surprising, given that even before the 
publication of the PGIP, South Korea was 
already considered an important partner 
in region, being embedded in numerous 
dialogues both bilaterally with Germany 
and other European Union (EU) member 
states and multilaterally with the EU and 
NATO. If anything, Seoul’s significance 
(along with that of other regional partner 
countries such as India, Australia, Japan, 
and the Association of Southeast Asian 
States – ASEAN) has been further elevated, 
as the Guidelines stipulate South Korea 
as one of the core cooperation partners in 
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three issue areas: security cooperation, fair 
and sustainable trade, and digital transfor-
mation. 
South Korea’s Geopolitical 
Dilemma and the Restrained 
Response to Germany’s PGIP 
As opposed to other regional states such as 
Vietnam, India, and Japan, among others, 
South Korea’s official response to the pub-
lication of the PGIP was much more re-
strained. There were neither media reports 
on the Guidelines, nor were any official 
statements released concerning the issue. 
However, this was not due to a sceptical 
attitude towards the contents, objectives, 
and proposed initiatives of the Guidelines, 
which both German and South Korean 
officials confirmed were generally viewed 
positively by Seoul. Rather, the response 
must be seen in the context of a much 
more general restraint by Seoul to openly 
address security affairs in the region. 
The dominant factors driving Seoul’s 
reluctant policy stance on the PGIP are South 
Korea’s challenging geopolitical position 
and the Moon Jae-in government’s desire 
for foreign policy autonomy. Even more so 
than other states in the region, South Korea 
has to carefully navigate between China 
and the United States, its own position 
within the SK-US alliance, its bilateral re-
lationship with Japan, and its relationship 
with North Korea. As such, for a long time 
South Korea appeared reluctant to adopt 
the Indo-Pacific language that permeates 
the foreign policy discourses of other US 
allies and partners in the region. In fact, 
Seoul already showed a similar restraint 
to the United States’ Free and Open Indo-
Pacific (FOIP) strategy, revealed in 2017 – 
whereas other US regional allies such as 
Japan, Australia, India, and ASEAN clari-
fied, enhanced, and coordinated their own 
approaches and strategies to the Indo-Pacific 
with those supported by the United States. 
This reluctance results from the fact that 
the Moon administration understands FOIP 
as a strategy driven by geopolitical com-
petition between the United States and 
China – South Korea’s two largest trading 
partners and the two major stakeholders in 
the question of peace and security on the 
Korean peninsula. Openly embracing FOIP 
to the extent that other US allies have would 
therefore inherently complicate Seoul’s 
relations with Beijing, which sees FOIP as 
a balancing strategy orchestrated by the 
United States and its allies aimed at con-
taining China’s rising power and regional 
influence. While it is true that other coun-
tries are faced with a similar dilemma, for 
South Korea the quest for greater foreign 
policy autonomy is at the very heart of 
national identity. Of course, while this does 
not suggest a “go-it-alone” approach by 
Seoul, there is a greater scepticism towards 
a full-fledged engagement of any external 
Indo-Pacific strategy. 
As one South Korean official vividly puts 
it: “In the midst of another and currently 
intensifying strategic competition between 
the US and China, which can be a starting 
point for another new Cold War, there is 
considerable difficulty in participating too 
closely in any external Indo-Pacific strategy.” 
Seoul’s policy is therefore to primarily offer 
quiet, diplomatic support for individual 
initiatives of FOIP and the PGIP in order to 
avoid overly antagonizing Beijing – and 
thus avoid Chinese punitive measures simi-
lar to those in 2017. 
At that time, South Korea had permitted 
the United States to deploy its THAAD missile 
defence system on Korean soil. In response, 
China’s National Tourism Administration 
instructed travel agencies to suspend selling 
group packages to South Korea. It directed 
its indignation specifically at the South 
Korean conglomerate Lotte after the com-
pany agreed to provide one of its golf 
courses near Seoul for the deployment of 
THAAD. Recognising the constraints of the 
intensifying China-US rivalry on its own 
foreign policy, South Korea seeks to care-
fully diversify its economic and strategic 
options. While Korea will “participate in 
such efforts that create new diplomatic 
space”, as one South Korean Foreign Minis-
try official puts it, Seoul has formulated its 
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own Indo-Pacific strategy instead of adopt-
ing an external strategy, which is envisioned 
to enable Seoul to diversify its foreign 
policy strategy, realise untapped economic 
opportunities, and will allow South Korea 
to maintain some semblance of foreign 
policy autonomy. 
South Korea’s New Southern 
Strategy and Overlaps to 
Germany’s PGIP 
 
The New Southern Policy (NSP) – Seoul’s 
de facto strategy for the Indo-Pacific – is 
characterised by a renewed focus on ASEAN 
and India based on three pillars, People, 
Prosperity and Peace, i.e., people-to-people 
exchanges, economic cooperation, and 
security. The introduction of the NSP by 
the Moon administration in 2017 was an 
attempt to address the necessity for South 
Korea to reduce its economic dependence 
on China and avoid unilateral imperatives 
in the security field. The design of the NSP 
can be seen as both a way to tackle inherent 
geopolitical and structural vulnerabilities 
as well as a direct response to Chinese eco-
nomic coercion against South Korea, applied 
in the form of sanctions in 2017, as dis-
cussed above. Therefore, the stress on eco-
nomic diversification is considered by South 
Korea as an implicit priority, as it allows 
Seoul to retain some room for manoeuvre 
in the foreign policy field while creating 
further opportunities for increasing co-
operation with ASEAN. As such, Seoul’s 
recent signing of the Regional Compre-
hensive Economic Partnership agreement 
is seen as a major step towards a greater 
diversification of its export markets and 
was thus hailed by the South Korean presi-
dential office as a “core result” of the NSP. 
A comparison of the South Korean and 
German strategies reveals substantial over-
laps and compatibilities that arise from 
their holistic structures and common con-
straints. In fact, both can be considered 
catch-all initiatives that make the expan-
sion of cooperation their main objective – 
a goal to be accomplished through a full 
utilisation of all available channels. A first 
attempt to clarify policy priorities was 
recently initiated by South Korea through 
the formulation of a New Southern Policy 
Plus Strategy, which slightly restricted the 
focus on seven main areas, but nonetheless 
retains a certain holism. As a result of a 
similar comprehensive approach to the 
Indo-Pacific, the overlaps between the NSP 
and the PGIP are conspicuous. 
In this context, the stress placed on 
ASEAN and multilateralism is a pivotal trait 
of both approaches. As stated by Moon: “It’s 
my goal to elevate Korea’s relationship with 
ASEAN to the level of its relations with the 
four major powers whose interests converge 
on the Korean Peninsula.” Similarly, the Ger-
man Federal Foreign Office confirmed that 
the Guidelines are a direct result of the 
realignment of Germany’s strategy towards 
ASEAN: The recent upgrading of the 
EU-ASEAN relationship to a Strategic Part-
nership has been, in fact, defined by the 
Foreign Office as “a milestone” for the 
implementation of the PGIP. This is also 
part of the broader EU action “Enhancing 
EU’s Role in Multilateral Fora in Asia”, 
which is designed to expand EU participa-
tion in fora such as the East Asia Summit. 
Since economic overdependence on 
China acts as the main constraint to a more 
autonomous foreign policy, a more diver-
sified economic cooperation – with a focus 
on free trade agreements, fair competition, 
sustainability, and innovation – is at the 
heart of both approaches. It is in this field 
that progress after the publication of the 
PGIP has become more visible: Currently, 
the two countries are, in fact, deepening 
economic cooperation in the field of green 
energy and the decommissioning of nuclear 
power plants while discussing further use 
of hydrogen to phase out coal. Exchanges 
in the field of 5G, AI, and cloud applica-
tions are explicitly indicated by Germany’s 
PGIP as being areas of interest for closer 
bilateral ties with South Korea; cooperation 
in this field has been carried out for years, 
in particular in the communication tech-
nology, digital, and R&D sectors. 
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Moreover, in the security field, both 
countries seem to be exhibiting a cautious 
approach to maritime security, which is 
apparent in the rules-based approach to the 
protection of freedom of navigation and the 
respect shown for the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
while retaining a privileged interest in non-
traditional security (NTS). 
The advanced version of the NSP clearly 
mirrors Germany’s cautious engagement in 
the security field, more clearly highlighting 
the prioritisation of cybersecurity, terror-
ism, emergency response, and environmen-
tal threats – in particular maritime pollu-
tion, and defence cooperation. Security 
cooperation with South Korea has been tra-
ditionally delegated to multilateral frame-
works within the EU, ASEAN, and NATO – 
frameworks such as the EU-ROK Cyber 
Dialogue and NATO’s Partners Across the 
Globe – as both countries are experiencing 
similar levels of constraints that oblige 
them to invest in multilateralism and NTS. 
The Framework Participation Agreement 
(2014) between the EU and ROK and the EU 
project “Enhancing Security Cooperation 
in and with Asia”, which sees ROK as one 
of five pilot countries, focus on areas such 
as counterterrorism, cyber threats, money 
laundering, and illicit trafficking. South 
Korea is, in fact, actively engaged in the fight 
against transnational crimes and law enforce-
ment efforts in South-East Asia through its 
partnership with ASEAN and through the 
“K-Cop Wave Program”; cooperation with 
Germany – one of the top destinations in 
Europe for smuggled migrants from the 
sub-Mekong region – would be worth ex-
ploring in this particular domain. Further-
more, the protection of human rights, 
the stress on good governance, and the em-
powerment of vulnerable groups under-
pin the NSP’s first pillar and illustrate that 
South Korea has been actively engaged 
since 1990 through the ASEAN-ROK Co-
operation Fund with an annual contribu-
tion of US$14 million in the development 
of human resources – efforts that are mir-
rored in the ASEAN-Germany Development 
Partnership. As is stated in the official Over-
view on the ASEAN-Germany Development 
Partnership: 
“Germany is among the largest contribu-
tors to supporting the ASEAN Communi-
ty building goals, with the current total 
contributions of approximately US$164 
million over the past decade to imple-
ment various cooperation programmes 
in the areas of agriculture, forestry, port 
development, energy efficiency, quality 
infrastructure, competition policy and 
law, among others.” 
Nevertheless, many of these overlapping 
commitments have not yet been highlighted 
as possible areas of cooperation in the Indo-
Pacific between the two countries, as the 
German Federal Foreign Office currently 
foresees possible opportunities only in the 
fields of development cooperation, capacity-
building, renewable energy, and climate 
change issues. 
Addressing or Avoiding 
Hard Security Challenges in 
the Indo-Pacific? 
The example of South Korea is instructive 
for yet another reason, namely how the 
PGIP and an eventual EU Strategy on the 
Indo-Pacific (will) deal with the manifold 
“hard security” issues in the region. Overall, 
the Guidelines, with the stated objective to 
strengthen peace, security, and stability in 
the Indo-Pacific region, aim at an increasing 
engagement in regional security issues. 
To understand why the resulting initiatives 
mainly focus on maritime security as well 
as NTS challenges is to acknowledge the 
immediate nexus between prosperity in 
Europe and security in Asia established 
in the Guidelines – with trade being the 
“limiting factor that prevents Germany from 
adopting a more confrontational approach”. 
It is mainly in the context of this econo-
my–security nexus that regional security 
policy-related risks and challenges – such 
as the North Korean nuclear weapon and 
missile programme, unresolved territorial 
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disputes about both land and maritime 
boundaries, the Taiwan and Hong Kong 
issues, conflicts over natural resources, and 
the growing rift between China and the 
United States – are interpreted. While 
these challenges might be hushed up in 
a strategy paper of a single European coun-
try, an EU-wide strategy on the region 
simply cannot afford to avoid these chal-
lenges if Brussels wants to be taken seriously 
as a security actor in the region. The for-
mulation of an EU Indo-Pacific strategy 
provides the opportunity (and necessity) 
for Brussels to finally position itself in – 
and more actively contribute to the diffu-
sion of – the major conflicts in the region. 
In the case of Korea, this would require 
a more constructive role to ensure stability 
on the peninsula. As stated by Heiko Maas 
in the preface of the Guidelines, “Germany 
must address even more strongly the exis-
tential security concerns of its long-stand-
ing partners, be involved in coming up with 
responses and make a tangible contribu-
tion.” Becoming more engaged in Korean 
peninsula security affairs certainly is no 
easy task, but if Brussels adopts a realistic 
approach based on European interests, 
there is room for Germany and Europe to 
cooperate – not only with the NSP being 
pursued by the current Moon administra-
tion, but also in the peace process on the 
Korean Peninsula. In fact, the Guidelines 
contain some of the major tools for a sen-
sible involvement of Berlin and Brussels in 
Korean peninsula security affairs. With the 
stated objective to strengthen peace, secu-
rity, and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, 
the Guidelines aim at an increasing engage-
ment in regional security issues in three 
specific issue areas: 
∎ increasing its security policy engage-
ment, 
∎ continuing to implement measures for 
civil crisis prevention, conflict manage-
ment, and peace-building, and 
∎ increasing its arms control and export 
control policy engagement in and with 
the Indo-Pacific. 
All of those issue areas will be inherent 
elements of any lasting peace process on 
the Korean peninsula. In fact, Germany has 
already significantly increased its resources 
and engagement in the field of stabilisation 
and mediation in the past years, including 
in the Indo-Pacific – a development largely 
based on the Federal Government’s Guide-
lines on “Preventing Crises, Managing Con-
flicts, and Building Peace”, adopted in 2017 
(Guidelines, 37). As such, there is both 
room and potential for transferring these 
experiences to the case of Korea. 
The German government also signalled 
its willingness to share its experiences and 
provide expertise to the region, strengthen 
both arms export control and arms control, 
participate in collective security measures, 
and help implement UN resolutions. 
Moreover, Berlin, in close coordination 
with European partners, is working to 
strengthen and expand security policy en-
gagement with and within the region, for 
example through the project “Enhancing 
Security Cooperation in and with Asia”, 
commissioned by the EU and the German 
Federal Foreign Office, and jointly imple-
mented by Expertise France and Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammen-
arbeit. 
To this end, Germany is undertaking 
specific measures to aid the EU in raising 
its profile as a regional security actor and 
extending its field of action on the basis 
of the Global Strategy for the European 
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. 
Outlook 
Leaving the Comfort Zone 
While the goal of the PGIP seems to be the 
diversification and expansion of coopera-
tion in the Indo-Pacific, Germany seems, 
nonetheless, to still be disproportionally 
relying on long-established partners such as 
Japan in key areas. If deepened cooperation 
with countries defined as “core partners”, 
such as South Korea, is hampered from 
reaching full potential because of relative 
complexities due to lack of communication 
or because of auto-imposed restraints in 
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collaborating on national policies such as 
the NSP, then the political willingness to 
participate in the shaping of the new inter-
national order might be brought into ques-
tion. As one Foreign Office official has put 
it, with regard to South Korea “there are 
many yet untapped […] areas of possible 
cooperation”. If Germany and the EU want 
to be perceived as new key actors in the 
region, a more pro-active engagement 
should be pursued, one that relies on the 
consideration that strategic partners are 
not always the ones who are better posi-
tioned in the geopolitics of the region or 
whose cooperation is more consolidated, 
but rather the ones whose change of status 
might lead to a transformation of the power 
equilibrium. Whereas Germany’s more 
immediate aim is economic diversification 
in order to pursue a more autonomous 
foreign policy, the final destination is the 
creation of a stable rules-based multilateral 
order in the Indo-Pacific. In this sense, 
South Korea – as one of the countries most 
restrained by Chinese scrutiny – will in-
credibly benefit from a comprehensive and 
truly committed cooperation with a partner 
whose reputation in avoiding unipolar im-
peratives is becoming increasingly clearer 
to international observers. The most immedi-
ate way for Germany and the EU to really 
shape the order in the Indo-Pacific might be 
through the empowerment of a player who 
has not really started to play yet. This could 
translate, for example, into enhanced col-
laboration with South Korea on connectivity 
and urban infrastructures projects, where 
opportunities for cooperation are largely 
overlooked. Support given to Korean com-
panies to participate in infrastructure 
development projects in the region within 
key areas such as “transportation, energy 
and water resource management”, in par-
ticular in the Mekong region, is a key part 
of the NSP’s economic pillar. Similarly, 
“Germany has a keen interest in sustainable 
connectivity – i.e., in building and expand-
ing infrastructure – with main trading 
partners in the Indo-Pacific region.” These 
are overlapping areas that offer more inter-
esting possibilities for cooperation by 
matching German investments and Korean 
know-how. In this field, the PGIP seems, in 
fact, to mainly be relying on the traditional 
cooperation with Japan, even if Korean 
construction and engineering companies 
“have a competitive business profile with 
relevant expertise, advanced technology 
and track records”, in addition to them 
striving towards obtaining Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) projects to expand their 
clientele away from traditional areas of 
engagement. Cooperation in a strategic 
region such as the Mekong, where bipolar 
competition is intensifying, or through the 
EU’s project “Connecting Europe and Asia”, 
would offer Korean companies a reliable 
alternative to participation in BRI projects. 
The EU Joint Communication on the above-
mentioned project, while already relying 
on cooperation with Japan, clearly recom-
mended the expansion of cooperation in this 
area with, among others, South Korea. In the 
end, the United States has recently proven 
that cooperation with NSP projects – by 
syncing national strategies, even in fields 
where cooperation was not previously taken 
into consideration – is possible, even for 
a country that shares far fewer compatible 
constraints with South Korea. 
Further Sync the Guidelines 
with the NSP 
Europe is late to the game in putting out 
an Indo-Pacific strategy. Many regional part-
ners have already coordinated their respec-
tive approaches to the FOIP strategy. Much 
more reluctantly, South Korea, too, has 
begun to coordinate its NSP with FOIP. For 
instance, already at the 3rd ROK-US Senior 
Economic Dialogue in December 2018, the 
two sides “discussed ways to work more 
closely together in implementing the New 
Southern Policy of the ROK and the Indo-
Pacific strategy of the US”. 
Moreover, at a joint press conference 
following Donald Trump’s visit to Seoul in 
July 2019, Moon stressed that the United 
States and South Korea had “reached a con-
sensus to put forth further harmonious 
cooperation between South Korea’s New 
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Southern Policy and the United States’ Indo-
Pacific strategy”. The remark was not only 
South Korea’s first-ever offering to officially 
support the Indo-Pacific strategy in the 
region, it was also an attempt to link the 
United States’ Indo-Pacific strategy to South 
Korea’s NSP, which Moon initiated to better 
position the country for economic oppor-
tunities in South-East Asia and reduce 
reliance on existing trading partners, par-
ticularly China. A joint factsheet published 
by the US Department of State emphasises 
that the two countries “continue to work 
together to create a safe, prosperous, and 
dynamic Indo-Pacific region through co-
operation between the Republic of Korea’s 
New Southern Policy and the United States’ 
Indo-Pacific Strategy based on the principles 
of openness, inclusiveness, transparency, 
respect for international norms, and ASEAN 
centrality”. 
Despite such steps towards coordination 
of the NSP and FOIP, however, South Korea’s 
general reluctance to fully embrace FOIP 
also leaves room for manoeuvring – both 
for Europe and South Korea. Germany’s 
(and eventually the EU’s) more inclusive 
Indo-Pacific strategy could well provide an 
opportunity for South Korea to further sync 
its efforts at offsetting dependence on China 
with European initiatives in the Indo-
Pacific. To the extent that the German and 
European regional strategy resembles the 
NSP, this indicates a number of possibilities 
for gradually bolstering regional relation-
ships beyond what is outlined in the Guide-
lines. In a first step, therefore, Germany and 
Europe together with South Korea should 
more forcefully sync the NSP and the PGIP, 
e.g., by publishing a “Joint Factsheet” that 
clearly identifies the most promising areas 
of cooperation and which promotes further 
cooperation between the PGIP and the NSP. 
As was already done with the United States, 
through specific Memoranda of Under-
standing, the South Korean and European 
governments could agree to coordinate 
regional projects in areas such as infrastruc-
ture development, digital transformation 
and connectivity, fair and sustainable trade, 
and people-to-people exchanges. In so do-
ing, Germany’s PGIP (and a potential Euro-
pean Indo-Pacific strategy) must clearly iden-
tify the added value for both the EU and the 
core partners. Going forward, one of the 
key challenges for the PGIP will be to assess 
its own impacts. This requires clearly iden-
tifying what a policy does and what role 
Germany and the Korean government could 
and should play as well as explicating how 
to manage the overlaps between the differ-
ent initiatives (e.g. on maritime security or 
digital transformation) within the PGIP and 
with other existing initiatives. This neces-
sitates a clear communication strategy, both 
within Germany and Europe as well as with 
the regional partner countries. Assessing the 
policy impacts of the PGIP would require 
an examination of different factors, e.g., 
whether the outcome would not have hap-
pened in the absence of the new strategy. 
Dr Eric J. Ballbach is Visiting Fellow in the Asia Research Division at SWP. 
Laura Morazzini was an Intern in the Asia Research Division at SWP. 
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